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In this paper we show that the acceleration of inflation in the United States after 1965 reflected a shift
in perceived responsibility for managing the country's international financial position.  Prior to 1965
this responsibility was lodged primarily with the Fed, whose policies resembled those of a central
bank playing by the gold standard rules of the game.  Over time, however, this responsibility was increasingly
assumed by the Treasury, while the Federal Reserve acquired increasing room for maneuver as a result
of the adoption of the Interest Equalization Tax and other policies with effects analogous to capital
controls.  Once the external constraint shaped policy less powerfully, the Fed pursued other goals more
aggressively, resulting in more inflationary pressure.  We document these points with a quantitative
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1.  Introduction 
  There is no shortage of explanations for the Great Inflation – for the acceleration of 
inflation in the late 1960s in the United States.  A first interpretation is that policy makers 
mistakenly adopted a nonmonetary view of inflation as driven by idiosyncratic (“cost 
push”) factors and disregarded monetary policy as a tool for containing price-level 
increases.
2  A second cites price-level disturbances in combination with a monetary policy 
rule that caused policy makers to accommodate the resulting inflationary pressures.
3  And a 
third interpretation is that policy makers mistakenly concluded that they could attain a 
permanently higher level of output by accepting a higher rate of inflation.
4 
  There is insight to be gained from each of these views.  We neither dispute their 
validity nor run a horserace between them.
5  But we argue that a full understanding of how 
and why policy makers allowed inflation to accelerate in the second half of the 1960s 
                                                 
1 Rutgers University and NBER, and University of California, Berkeley and NBER, respectively.  This paper 
was prepared for the NBER Conference on the Great Inflation, Woodstock, Vermont, September 25-27, 2008.  
We are grateful to Owen Humpage and Michael Shenk at the Cleveland Fed for facilitating our reading and 
analysis of the FOMC minutes. We also thank Hyun Hak Kim for able research assistance. 
2 See Nelson (2005).  In effect they saw inflation as unresponsive to aggregate demand and therefore to 
monetary policy actions.  
3 See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). 
4 As emphasized by Sargent (1999) and Romer and Romer (2002)..  Some compounded this error by 
overestimating the output gap.  This is the argument of Orphanides (2003, 2004), to which we return below.  
Others assumed the existence of an exploitable output-inflation relationship but perceived a steepening of the 
tradeoff, encouraging them to accept higher inflation in order to maintain unemployment at low levels.  See 
Taylor (1997) and Primiceri (2005).   
5 Indeed it can be argued that the three categories of explanation described in this paragraph are not entirely 
distinct from one another.  But that is a topic for another paper.   2
requires one also to understand why the same factors did not operate previously – what it 
was, in other words, that restrained inflationary tendencies in earlier years. 
  Here our emphasis differs from that in the previous literature.  We argue that 
Federal Reserve policy prior to the Great Inflation – for present purposes the period 1959-
1965 – resembled that of a central bank following the gold standard rules of the game.
6  
The stability of the dollar exchange rate (under Bretton Woods, the dollar price of gold) 
was a priority for policy.  Hence balance-of-payments developments that could undermine 
the stability of the exchange rate drew a sharp reaction.  A potentially inflationary increase 
in aggregate demand that threatened to suck in imports and crowd out exports elicited an 
increase in rates.  Accelerating inflation that augered a deterioration in international 
competitiveness similarly caused the Fed to tighten.  The value attached by the Fed to the 
stability of the exchange rate was public knowledge.   Thus, when demand increased and 
the balance of payments weakened, awareness that the Fed would tighten limited the 
inflationary consequences.  The Fed’s commitment to following the Bretton Woods rules of 
the game anchored expectations.  It limited inflationary inertia and prevented inflation from 
taking off in response to shocks.
7 
  The attentive reader will note that we have shifted from referring to the gold 
standard rules to the Bretton Woods rules.  This usage is intended to flag that we are 
                                                 
6 Prior to 1959 the same policy priorities prevailed, but this being the period of the dollar shortage the 
balance-of-payments constraint was rarely binding.  For more on this see Section 3 below. 
7 In arguing that lifting the exchange rate anchor altered expectations and in turn forced policy makers to 
respond in ways that validated inflationary expectations, we are applying the expectations-trap model 
popularized by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Christiano and Gust (2000).  However, neither of these 
treatments mentions the exchange rate or links the exchange rate regime to the expectations trap.  Armenter 
and Bodenstein (2005) suggest that an expectations trap is less likely under a pegged than a flexible exchange 
rate, but they do not refer to Bretton Woods.   3
referring not to the simple textbook characterization of the rules of the game under the gold 
standard, according to which a central bank mechanically responds to reserve increases and 
losses and disregards other possible influences on policy, but to a more nuanced version in 
which the central bank is also influenced by other factors.  We are not arguing that balance-
of-payments considerations were the only factor shaping policy.
8  We are not even arguing 
that they were always, or even usually, the most important factors in the decisions of the 
FOMC, although as we show below they in fact dominated on a number of occasions.  But 
we are arguing that close attention to the role of balance-of-payments concerns is necessary 
in order to understand why Fed policy was even less inflationary in the first half of the 
1960s than one would expect on the basis of the Taylor rule.
9 
What changed after 1965 was not just the model of the economy and the priorities 
of policy makers, these being the emphases of much of the previous literature, but also 
perceptions of the assignment of tasks.  In the earlier period, defending the dollar had been 
perceived as a shared responsibility of the Treasury and the Fed, with the latter assuming a 
significant share of the burden.  But starting when it negotiated a gold pooling arrangement 
with foreign central banks and pushed through the Interest Rate Equalization Tax, Treasury 
and more broadly the Administrative Branch assumed more responsibility for defense of 
the dollar.  The Fed perceived itself as freer to pursue other goals.   
This perceptual shift was further encouraged by policies that can be thought of as 
quasi capital controls, like the just-mentioned Interest Equalization Tax.  These policies 
                                                 
8 In practice, precisely the same can be said of the 19
th century and interwar gold standard years.  See 
Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985). 
9 A fact that we document in Section 5 below.   4
loosened the link between inflation and the exchange rate.  They relaxed the constraints that 
had shaped monetary policy and anchored expectations in prior years.  They allowed the 
Fed to rationalize more expansionary policies.  Now if the central bank adopted more 
expansionary policies, it did not have to worry to the same extent as before that this would 
cause the balance of payments to deteriorate.  And if the balance of payments did in fact 
deteriorate, it was now the Treasury rather than the Fed that was primarily responsible for 
dealing with the consequences.
10    
On occasions when balance of payments pressure rose to alarming levels, which 
still could happen given the permeability of the quasi-controls, the Fed responded as before.  
But it did so less regularly.  Together with the knowledge that the central bank now felt 
freer to pursue other goals, this meant that the exchange rate commitment anchored 
expectations less effectively.   Moreover, the view, whether valid or not, that a different 
government agency, Treasury, was now primarily responsible for the stability of the dollar 
and the balance of payments, a responsibility that it also had the capacity to discharge, 
encouraged the belief within the Fed that inflation could be allowed to accelerate without 
violating one its key objectives, which was to maintain the stability of the dollar.  It 
fostered the belief that the central bank could pursue high employment more aggressively 
while remaining less vigilant about inflation than before.   
  What is different in our account from the previous literature?  We do not depart 
from other recent work describing a growing inclination not just in the Fed but also in the 
Executive Branch to enlist monetary policy in the pursuit of full employment and growth 
                                                 
10 Which it could do by increasing taxes on foreign investments, reducing military spending abroad, and 
adopting other fiscal expedients.   5
even if they were attained at the cost of price stability.  We do not dispute accounts 
emphasizing how the Fed increasingly disregarded the inflationary consequences of its 
policies in order to pursue other goals.  But we offer a different explanation for why the 
monetary policy makers felt free to do so.  This explanation also points to a different 
periodization than most of the earlier literature.  We see the Great Inflation as taking off in 
1965, since this was when the reassignment of predominant responsibility for exchange rate 
stability became clear.  Scholars emphasizing other factors point in contrast to the late 
1960s or the early 1970s.  While it may have taken until then for the full extent of 
inflationary pressures to be unleashed, the precipitating shift in the policy framework, we 
argue, occurred around 1965 and critically involved the perception that primary 
responsibility for the dollar exchange rate had shifted to the Treasury.
11 
   Section 2 presents an overview of Fed policy and its motivations in the 1960s based 
on the Board of Governor’s Annual Reports.  Section 3 then uses narrative evidence from 
the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee to develop our view that balance-of-
payments considerations played a key role in shaping monetary policy decisions before 
1965 and exercised a restraining influence on inflation.  Section 4 shows that this situation 
changed subsequently.  Section 5 then supplements this analysis of narrative record with a 
variety of bits of statistical evidence pointing in the same direction, after which Section 6 
concludes.
12 
                                                 
11 Statistical evidence (below) suggests that the inflation process ratcheted up in several steps in the course of 
the 1960s and early 1970s; our interpretation points to changes in the perception and priority attached to 
balance-of-payments concerns as explaining the first ratchet around 1965. 
12 Appendix 1 describes the measures adopted by the Treasury to contain balance of payments pressure in the 
1960s.   6
2.  An Overview of FOMC Decision Making 
If the dollar and the balance of payments were of concern to the Fed and influenced 
the conduct of policy prior to 1965, then this should be evident in the words and deeds of 
the Federal Open Market Committee.  We take two approaches to determining whether this 
was the case.  In this section we construct a summary of FOMC policy actions from the 
Board of Governors’ Annual Report.  Following that, in the next two sections we flesh out 
those policy actions with a narrative of the period and quotes from FOMC minutes. 
For every FOMC meeting from 1959 to 1971 we describe the policy decision taken, 
the reason given for it (whether domestic or international or both), the number of dissents, 
the direction of the dissents, and whether the concept of “even keel” was invoked.  (“Even 
keel” was the name given to the post-Accord policy of the Fed, which sought to facilitate 
Treasury funding operations by stabilizing the Treasury bill market while also pursuing 
other objectives; see Markese 1973.)   
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows policy actions: decisions to tighten are the 
positive bars, while decisions to ease are the negative bars.  For decisions to keep policy 
unchanged, no bar is shown.  In addition we indicate whether the actions were taken 
primarily for domestic reasons (white bars) or primarily for international reasons (black 
bars) or for a combination of both reasons (cross hatched bars).
13  We also show in the 
upper panel of Figure 1 the key policy instruments that the FOMC referred to at the time: 
the federal funds rate, the 90 day Treasury bill rate, and the discount rate.   
                                                 
13 Appendix 2 presents the data underlying Figure 1. In addition to the information in the figure, it shows the 
number of attendees present and absent at each meeting and the vote taken.   Information from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Annual Reports was gathered and summarized with the help of Michael Shenk of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland.   7
The lower panel shows the dissents. The bars above the line indicate that the 
dissenter wanted a tighter policy than enacted, while the bars below the line indicate that 
the dissenter wanted policy to be looser than what was enacted.  The length of the bars 
indicates the number of dissents.  Their colors indicate the division between domestic, 
international and mixed, as in the upper panel. 
The number of meetings with black bars indicating policy actions motivated 
primarily by international considerations is not large (7 out of a total of  210) all of which 
indicated increased restraint.  These cases are concentrated before late 1965, although they 
also appear occasionally thereafter at times that are associated with a dramatic deterioration 
in the balance of payments, such as the aftermath of sterling’s devaluation in late 1967 and 
the collapse of the Gold Pool in 1968.   
The number of meetings where there are cross-hatched bars indicating that a 
combination of domestic and international factors motivated the policy is considerable: 
there are 23 of these.  These meetings which also indicated increased restraint occurred 
both before 1965 and during crisis periods in 1967, 1968 and 1971.  
We do not read this evidence as indicating that balance of payments considerations 
dictated monetary policy decisions in the first half of the 1960s, any more than they strictly 
dictated central bank decision making under the prewar and interwar gold standards.  
Rather, we see concern over the balance of payments as tipping the balance – but often 
importantly so, at least in the period before 1965. 
 
   8
3.  Narrative Evidence, 1959-65  
Having shown what the FOMC did and provided a summary characterization of 
why, we now recount what it said about its decisions in more detail.  In this section we 
focus on the period when balance-of-payments considerations repeatedly influenced the 
Committee’s policy decisions.  Section 4 paints the contrast with the subsequent period.
14 
Economic policy under the Eisenhower administration emphasized balanced 
budgets, price stability and maintenance of the Bretton Woods peg to gold at $35 an ounce.  
Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin also was a firm believer in 
adherence to the gold peg.  He was supported by a number of FOMC members, especially 
Alfred Hayes, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who throughout the 
Bretton Woods period advocated policy tightening to protect the monetary gold stock and 
offset incipient balance of payments deficits. 
 Until the beginning of 1959, when Western European countries attained current 
account convertibility, there was little pressure on U.S. gold reserves.  1959 was the first 
time when significant concern was voiced about the stability of the dollar.  The 1959-60 
recession, largely engineered by tight monetary policy, led to both price deflation and a 
gold inflow in the classical manner.
15  FOMC minutes document that the Fed’s decision to 
maintain a tight policy was importantly influenced by balance-of-payments considerations.   
                                                 
14 We also searched for other bits of narrative evidence, for example in the memoirs of Treasury and Federal 
Reserve officials.  One who speaks to the issues at hand is Charles Coombs, who was responsible for 
international operations at the New York Fed.  He alludes indirectly to the kind of shift of perceived 
responsibility from the Fed to the Treasury that we emphasize here, although he places it somewhat later, at 
the time when the Nixon Administration took office and Fowler and Deming took over at Treasury (“The role 
of the Federal Reserve in foreign financial policy was severely curtailed after the accession of the Nixon 
administration in January 1969.")  See Coombs (1976), p.xii, 190-191.  
15 For more detail see Meltzer (2009 forthcoming), Chapter 2.   9
For example, at the FOMC on January 6
th, 1959, when the vote was to maintain policy, 
President Hayes said that “it was possible that when questions had been raised about the 
stability of the dollar, an action taken on the disciplinary side of System monetary policy 
would bring credit rather than discredit on System intentions.  If nothing else it was quite 
likely that our upward movement of Treasury Bill yields in the United Sates to equality 
with or above, the yield on Treasury bills in the United Kingdom would tend to stem the 
outflow of gold from the United States.  Moreover it might draw gold back to this country 
because of more attractive investment opportunities offered in the U.S. Government 
securities market” (p.19).
16 
Then on October 4
th, 1960 when the action taken was to maintain the current stance 
of decreased restraint, Mr. Treiber of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York emphasized 
how it was “important that the United States act promptly and wisely to rectify the balance 
of payments deficit. Failure to do so will more and more circumscribe the ability of the 
Federal Reserve to pursue a flexible monetary policy…” (p.16).  President Leach of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston warned that “ More ease…would not be of material 
assistance to the economy, but would affect the balance of payments adversely and could 
make the task of monetary policy more difficult in the future” (p.30).  Also at the October 
25
th, 1960 meeting, when the policy directive was to maintain decreased restraint, the 
accompanying statement for the first time recognized the balance of payments problem.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was “directed to [conduct open market operations] 
in light of current and prospective economic conditions … with a view …(b) to 
                                                 
16 Page numbers indicated in parentheses in this section refer to the page in the minutes of the FOMC meeting 
cited on which the quoted material appears.   10
encouraging monetary expansion  for the purpose of fostering sustainable growth in 
economic activity and employment, while taking into consideration current international 
developments…” 
Hayes elaborated the point.  “We have recognized right along, ever since our 
balance of payments became seriously adverse in 1958, that although domestic 
considerations must be our main concern, we could not ignore the international 
implications of our actions. It so happened that during this time our policies were well 
suited to both domestic and international conditions…but this has no longer been true 
during much of 1960, and last month’s gold episode [when the London price of gold spiked 
to $40.00 per ounce on the fears that a Kennedy administration would be inflationary] 
should serve as dramatic evidence that we are dealing with a complex and sensitive 
problem with respect to the international financial position.  Undoubtedly one of the causes 
of the gold speculation has been fear that this country might want to unduly loosen 
monetary and fiscal policies in an effort to combat recessionary tendencies” (p.16).   “It 
seems to me that the balance of payments deficit, with all of the complications which may 
accompany it in the way of gold sales and loss of confidence in the dollar confronts all 
Americans with an extremely serious if not almost intractable problem… All of this argues 
strongly for our avoiding further overt measures of monetary ease, such as a discount rate 
cut, unless they are clearly called for by the state of the domestic economy…and I do not 
think they are at present” (p.170).  Canby Balderston of the Board of Governors agreed, 
stating that he “would favor a change in the directive such as Mr. Hayes had suggested 
[while inserting “while taking into consideration current international developments”].  The   11
gold outflow was part of the total problem; to ignore it would be unwise and might reflect 
on the System in the future” (p.43). 
On November 22
nd, 1960 when the decision was to keep policy unchanged, 
Chairman Martin stated that “he continued to believe that the balance of payments problem 
was the most important problem for the country to deal with at this time. This was because 
he believed it to be the most significant shadow in the domestic business picture, and the 
only way he could point this up was to say that the credit of the U.S. was now in danger” 
(p.41).  Then on January 10
th ,1961, when the policy action continued to be to maintain the 
policy of the previous year, A.L. Mills of the Board of Governors stated that “[i]n his view, 
it would be much more in order to permit the reserve position of the bank to tighten to a 
degree that would find the short-term interest rate moving up from its artificially low level 
which would be conducive to checking the outflow of funds and possibly recovering 
it…the economic affairs of the country had reached a point where it became necessary to 
use monetary policy  as a surgical scalpel to correct dramatically a very difficult 
international financial situation….it was a serious responsibility of the Federal Reserve 
Banks and of the members of Board of Governors to take into account first the international 
situation and to consider what detailed steps should be taken that would be most conducive 
to a more harmonious international financial position” (p.29). 
There is a good deal of narrative evidence, then, that balance-of-payments 
considerations figured in the considerations of members of the FOMC, leading to a policy 
of a more restrained monetary policy than might have prevailed otherwise.   12
Elected in the fall of 1960 with a mandate to “get America moving again” and a 
commitment to restore full employment, President John F. Kennedy also believed firmly in 
the importance of maintaining the gold parity.  Pressure on gold reserves and a growing 
balance of payments deficit, reflecting U. S. private and public foreign investment in excess 
of the current account surplus, emerged as important problems in these years. U. S. 
Treasury under Secretary Douglas Dillon and Under Secretary Robert Roosa supplemented 
the efforts of the Fed to stem the dollar outflow, intervening in the foreign exchange market, 
developing a network of swap agreements with other countries starting in March 1961 (an 
arrangement in which the Fed joined a year later), issuing Roosa bonds (foreign-currency-
denominated U.S. Treasury securities), creating the IMF’s General Agreements to Borrow, 
and establishing the London Gold Pool.
17   While the Fed continued to pay considerable 
attention to the balance of payments when determining the stance of policy, the increased 
activism of the Treasury in complementing its efforts helped to set the stage for the 
subsequent period when the Fed felt free to delegate responsibility for the dollar and the 
balance of payments to Treasury.  
FOMC meetings between 1961 and 1964 featured vigorous debate between those, 
usually including Chairman Martin, who advocated tight policy to defend the dollar and the 
proponents of looser conditions designed to stimulate growth and reduce unemployment.  
On multiple occasions, stalemate between the two groups led to no change in policy.  In our 
view, policy almost certainly would have been loosened in a number of these instances 
                                                 
17 The swap arrangements were an attempt to create credit lines big enough to finance short-term balance of 
payments pressures on the scale that might be suffered by the United States.  The Gold Pool, for its part, was 
an arrangement designed to limit conversion of dollars into gold by foreign central banks.     13
absent the importance attached by the first faction to balance-of-payments considerations.  
In addition, on several occasions the FOMC voted to raise rates in part to protect the 
balance of payments: specific instances of the latter included December 18
th, 1962, May 7
th, 
1963 and July 30
th, 1963.  The second and third of these increases were part of Operation 
Twist, conducted in cooperation with the Treasury, under which the Fed raised short-term 
interest rates to stem capital outflows while the Treasury lowered long-term rates to 
stimulate domestic investment.  Again, we would argue that these increases would have 
been unlikely had balance-of-payments considerations not tipped the balance. 
At its meeting on August 1
st, 1961, the FOMC had voted to maintain its policy 
stance.  The statement explaining this decision contained an explicit reference to the 
balance of payments deficit.   “…to encourage expansion of bank credit and the money 
supply so as to contribute to strengthening the focus of recovery, while giving 
consideration to international factors…”  (p.57).  Moreover, several Committee members 
argued vigorously for tightening policy in response to the deteriorating international 
position.  According to Treiber, “[o]bservers abroad are likely to interpret excessive ease 
here, particularly as symbolized by a low T-bill rate, as indication of an unwillingness or 
inability on the part of the U.S. to take the steps necessary to assure the soundness of the 
dollar” (p. 23).  Mr. Deming, a non-voting FOMC participant, suggested further that “[a]s 
to the directive, in the light of recent developments in Europe he would suggest the 
possibility of inserting the word “increased” before “considerations “ in the phrase of 
clause (b) [of the directive] now reading “while giving consideration to international 
factors” (p. 31).  And Rouse, manager of the System Open Market Account, warned that   14
“[t]he questions that had been asked of him [by the BIS governors] about Government 
expenditures, the Federal budget, and related matters were indication of a background of 
concern about possible developments in this country over a period of time. They indicated a 
feeling that the U.S. ultimately would have to resolve the same questions that the British 
were trying to resolve at the present time” (p.55). 
In the meeting on October 3
rd, 1961, the Committee again voted to keep policy 
unchanged, and its statement again spoke of the need for attention to the balance of 
payments.  Some members advocated going further and made the case for tightening in 
response to deteriorating balance-of-payments conditions.  Thus, Charles Shepardson of the 
Board of Governors expressed his view that “it would be fortunate if there was some rise in 
the bill rate in the light of the international situation” (p. 12).  As Mills put it, “the disparity 
between short-term interest rates in this country and Great Britain argues for higher rates in 
this country as a hindrance against renewed gold losses and…to counter inflationary 
influences” (p. 13).  Again, these last words are an important reminder that concern over 
the balance of payments was not always the only or the most important factor, but this 
narrative evidence should make clear that it figured importantly in the minds of some 
members. 
At its October 24
th, 1961 meeting, the FOMC again voted to maintain the current 
policy while again appending a caution concerning the balance of payments.  A growing 
number of Committee members invoked deteriorating balance-of-payments conditions as 
reason for tightening.  As President Irons of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas put it, “In 
terms of the domestic situation…it would seem reasonable to continue about the same   15
degree of ease that had existed during the past three weeks. However the international 
situation presented a problem calling for a somewhat different conclusion. The forthcoming 
Treasury refunding… suggests maintaining the status quo. Balancing these out, the 
Committee might do well to give more attention to firming short-term rates in order to 
provide relief on the international side without creating instability or undue restriction in 
the domestic market” (p.21).  Mr. Clay of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
expressly referred to the impact of Fed policy on capital flows when he observed that “the 
Manager of the System Open Account would need to conduct open market operations with 
a view to keep the treasury bill rate from going too low relative to rates abroad (page 29).  
Mr. Heflin of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond cautioned that “the delicate and 
uneasy position of the dollar suggested  that it would be unwise to move toward additional 
ease…” (p.31).  Mills warned that “a start [must be] made toward implementing a 
moderately restraining monetary and credit policy… The skeptical attitude to Federal 
Reserve system policies that has been taken by domestic and foreign monetary experts, and 
which is a factor in the weakness of the dollar on the international exchanges and in 
renewed gold losses, is perhaps the strongest reason that urges a revision of policy 
thinking…” (p.33).  Balderston asked rhetorically “whether the transfer abroad of gold and 
dollars plus the widened interest differential between New York and London, was serious 
enough to give concern. To this question his answer was in the affirmative” (p.49).  Finally, 
Hayes  acting as Chairman in Martin’s absence warned “that on balance the System would 
lose more by standing aside than by doing what it could to indicate that it saw danger on 
the international exchanges…he then said he thought that at least a goodly number of those   16
around the table had expressed some concern about the international problem and had 
recognized that there was perhaps something the System could do to help, in a minor way, 
to show that it was aware of the problem, without doing damage to the domestic economy” 
(p.51). 
Again at the meeting on November 14, the vote was for no change, but now there 
were dissents in favor of tightening for balance-of-payments reasons.  In the opinion of 
Treiber, “[t]he most disturbing factor now before us is our poor balance of payments… The 
rise in short-term rates since last month…should be helpful from the international 
viewpoint…As for the directive, it seems to me that in light of international factors and the 
basic strength of the domestic economy, the committee could properly change the directive 
so as to put less emphasis on encouraging credit expansion and greater emphasis on 
international factors” (p.24).  Here, clearly, balance-of-payments concerns had tipped the 
opinion of at least one FOMC member in favor of tightening, although they had not yet 
convinced the majority. 
Then on December 19
th, 1961, the FOMC voted 8 to 4 in favor of increased restraint 
for both domestic and international reasons. Hayes was not satisfied; he pushed for even 
greater attention to the balance of payments.  He wished to change the directive to read 
“giving special attention to international factors” instead of “giving consideration to 
international factors’ (p.13).   His change was not adopted. Then at the next meeting on 
January 23, the FOMC voted to maintain the degree of tightening from the previous 
meeting, again mentioning the balance of payments.  Once more Hayes pushed for 
tightening to help the international situation by raising the discount rate.  As he put it, “This   17
country is just too easy a place in which to borrow and not a sufficiently attractive place in 
which to invest. As the domestic economy continues to improve, we can very well afford to 
take steps to modify this set of conditions and try to induce some return flow of capital…In 
terms of open market policy this means that we should edge towards less ease…In our 
Bank…[we] have done a good deal of soul-searching lately on the subject of a possible 
discount rate increase.  The balance of payments problem is serious enough to raise the 
question whether we could not act on the rate in advance of a market rate rise, in order to 
emphasize the increase as a signal of our determination to do our part in meeting the critical 
international problem” (p.11). 
A series of meetings then passed without additional reference to the balance of 
payments. But at the December 18
th, 1962 meeting, the FOMC voted to increase restraint 
primarily for international reasons, although there were five dissents.  Hayes strongly 
supported the decision.  “In his judgment the balance of payments situation was the biggest 
single shadow over the domestic business picture. He did not believe that a slightly less 
easy monetary policy [to alleviate the balance of payments deficit] would in any sense 
collapse the domestic economy. In fact such a change in emphasis might lead to a 
strengthening of confidence” (p.61).   
There followed a series of meetings where the policy of December 1962 was 
maintained and both Hayes and Martin pushed for more attention to external balance.  As 
Hayes put the case on February 12
th, “the magnitude of the balance of payments problem is 
much too great to be solved by monetary policy alone. Nevertheless, monetary policy can 
and should play an important part, and I would hope that it could do so simultaneously with   18
a … well publicized program on the part of the Administration to achieve equilibrium in 
our international payments, including a substantial net reduction in military and aid 
disbursements abroad and a firm policy towards greater discipline in the area of production 
costs” (p.20).  Chairman Martin reinforced the point, observing that “if the System had 
been derelict in 1962 it was probably in paying a minimum of attention to the balance of 
payments problem. There was little question in his mind but that a crisis was 
approaching…” (p.48). At the next meeting, on March 5
th, the vote was again to maintain, 
and both Hayes and Martin again stressed the balance of payments.  Hayes put it this way: 
‘The outflow of gold was resumed last week and the prospect is for substantial gold sales 
during the coming month…we are clearly getting closer to the danger point as the gold 
stock diminishes while the balance of payments deficit continues unabashed…Admittedly a 
move toward lesser ease would involve some risk with respect to the domestic 
economy…they are minor risks compared with the growing danger to the dollar’s 
international standing….There might …be an opportunity later in the month for an increase 
in the discount rate if the System was willing to give a clear signal of its concern for our 
international position” (p.47).  And “[w]ith respect to the balance of payments… [Chairman 
Martin] continued to feel that conditions were gradually moving toward a crisis of some 
sort…too much attention has been paid to stimulating the domestic economy through 
monetary policy and not enough for dealing with the balance of payments…the balance of 
payments problem had become the real shadow over the domestic business scene” (p.82).  
On June 18
th, 1963, for a third time the vote was to maintain, although Hayes and others 
now pushed for an increase in the discount rate to ease the international situation.  As   19
Hayes put it, “the time for decision is at hand …the continued gravity of the international 
position leaves us little choice, especially in the light of the Treasury’s calendar…An 
increase of one half percent in the discount rate in the near future could be expected to 
serve two very important purposes; 1. to signal to the foreign monetary authorities and to 
the world in general that the System is ready to use traditional tools of monetary policy to 
defend the international position of the dollar, and 2. to achieve a level of short-term market 
rates that should cause a substantial repatriation of short funds” (p.22).  Braddock Hickman, 
an alternate member of the FOMC, was more to the point.  “The raising of interest rates,” 
he stated, “might deter some investments but at the same time it would represent a forward 
step in dealing with the balance of payments problem…” (p.54).   
By the time of the July 9
th, 1963 meeting, sentiment for tightening, primarily for 
balance of payments reasons, had become more widespread.  According to Hayes “the 
dollar has clearly reached a vulnerable stage. The forthcoming gold losses caused by 
French purchases will tend to unsettle the exchange markets and there are increasingly 
ominous signs of apprehension and impatience among central banks in Europe…[it] 
behooves us to demonstrate that progress is being made on the balance of payments front 
before the apprehension reaches crisis proportions.  For years there has been a heavy short-
term drain…and it seems wholly reasonable to believe that an appreciable firming of short-
term rates in this country would check the flow and might then bring a reversal. In addition 
it could have very important psychological effects by signaling…the determination of the 
System to have a strong dollar…the System would be prepared to take positive actions as 
soon as possible in the form of a one half per cent increase in the discount rate…[the New   20
York Fed] directors have felt for some time that we should be giving greater emphasis to 
our international responsibilities…it would be important for the System to act in advance of 
rather than after, any administration announcement of a systemic attack on the balance of 
payments problem” (pp.29-31).  Hickman again echoed the point: “In so far as policy over 
the next 3 months was concerned…a shift was not only appropriate but long overdue. The 
domestic economy continued to move ahead and the balance of payments to deteriorate. [I] 
would recommend moving immediately toward a higher term structure of interest rates…” 
(p.40).  Chairman Martin stated his willingness to “support an increase in the discount 
rate…[as] part of a concerted  attack on the balance of payments problem” (p.70).  Again, 
we are not arguing that balance of payments considerations were the exclusive or even the 
primary explanation for the 50 basis point increase in the discount rate decided on July 17.  
But they clearly played an important role in tipping the balance of opinion in favor. 
  There was little further discussion of the balance of payments for the remainder of 
1963 or in early 1964 although “contributing to improving the balance of payments” was 
always in the directive..  At that point the issue resurfaced.  On June 17
th, 1964 the FOMC 
voted to leave policy unchanged.  But Hayes once again pushed for tightening to strengthen 
the balance of payments, though acknowledging that conditions were not conducive for 
such a move.  “[Our] bargaining position in international financial matters has been 
dramatically weakened as our cumulative deficit has grown.  We cannot afford to let the 
situation continue for long without taking decisive steps to check it. …the balance of 
payments outlook would justify our taking a clear step toward less credit ease at this time.  
[I admit] the difficulty of obtaining much public support for such a move in the virtual   21
absence of immediate inflation development here in this country and against the favorable 
first quarter balance of payments. Also the imminence of treasury financing is an important 
inhibiting factor.  Thus I am led to the reluctant conclusion that we should stay our hand, in 
so far as an immediate policy move is concerned” (p.24). 
Again in the autumn of 1965 Hayes and others expressed concern about inflation 
and the deteriorating balance of payments and pressed for a 50 basis point increase in the 
discount rate.  At the meeting on October 12, 1965 he noted that “concern over prices and 
costs seems to be particularly warranted by the unsatisfactory state of the balance of 
payments and the prospect that we may have trouble keeping the U.S. trade surplus up to its 
present level in view of the likelihood that imports will be strongly stimulated by the 
business expansion… the effort to reach ultimate [balance of payments] equilibrium 
without the need of artificial barriers will…call for a strong concerted effort including an 
appropriate contribution by monetary policy…,…Looking ahead …[I] have a real basis for 
concern about potential inflation pressure, against a background of cumulative large 
increases in bank credit and a serious international payments problem that leaves us little 
margin for assuming inflation risk…[I see] an increase in the discount rate as the most 
appropriate method of signaling a move toward greater firmness in monetary policy and 
validating the firming  that has already occurred in market rates…I think a one half per cent 
increase [in the discount rate] is fully justified if we look only at international factors” 
(pp.24-26).  Balderston, supported Hayes’ position.  “[A]n increase in the discount 
rate…internationally …should [lead to] a new measure of confidence in the dollar, and 
perhaps seek interest rate incentives to investment in the U.S.” (p.67). This time Chairman   22
Martin was more cautious.  “With a divided Committee and in the face of strong 
Administrative opposition he didn’t believe it would be appropriate for him to lend his 
support to those who favored a change in policy now…he hoped the debate about the role 
of monetary policy in dealing with the balance of payments could be shifted away from the 
question whether the deficit can be entirely overcome by interest rate action alone…he did 
not believe that was possible” (p.69-71). 
On November 23
rd, 1965 Hayes reiterated the point.  “In my judgment this 
combination of circumstances [inflationary pressure and adverse balance of payments] 
points to a clear policy conclusion. The time has come for an overt move to signal a firm 
monetary policy, and an increase in the discount rate by one half per cent is the appropriate 
means of affecting such a change…he is prepared to recommend that the New York 
directors vote a one half percent discount rate increase within the next week or so” (p.35-
36).   Now support came from additional quarters.  According to President Ellis of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, “it was evident that further measures would be required to 
restrain capital outflow.  One such measure, a move towards lesser ease would not only 
buttress the special credit restraint measures being employed but would serve as a widely 
understood monetary signal that would strengthen the willingness to hold dollars abroad” 
(p.35).  Dewey Daane of the Board of Governors added that “[l]ast but not least on [his] list 
of economic reasons for a System policy change was the deterioration in the U.S. balance 
of payments...” (p.69). 
At the December 6
th meeting Hayes observed that although the rise in the discount 
rate and the revision of Regulation Q ceilings would “prove valuable both in extending the   23
duration of the present business upswing and in bolstering the international position of the 
dollar…[there is] need for Open Market policy to back up official rate action…Any threat 
to reasonable price stability also has serious implications for our balance of payments 
deficit” (p.25).  The FOMC agreed, and voted for a 50 basis point hike in the discount rate.   
This was the decision that led the president to verbally attack Martin during the chairman’s 
visit shortly thereafter to the LBJ ranch, an experience that Meltzer and others argue 
significantly weakened Martin’s anti-inflationary resolve.
18  
 
4.  Narrative Evidence 1966-71 
There was then little reference to balance-of-payments considerations in 1966 or the 
first half of 1967.   In the spring of 1966 the Fed tightened policy because of concern about 
inflationary pressures. This led to a credit crunch later in the year. In the face of pressure 
from the housing industry and Congress the Fed shifted its policy in favor of ease early in 
1967 (Meltzer forthcoming, chapter 4). In this period international reserves improved very 
briefly although the monetary gold stock kept declining (Bordo 1993). The return to looser 
monetary policy was then reflected in continued deterioration in the balance of payments. 
In this environment, it appears that the Fed simply did not feel the same responsibility for 
addressing those balance-of-payments problems as before.  Now day-to-day responsibility 
for such matters fell to Treasury.  Only when a major threat to the stability of the dollar 
developed did the Fed feel compelled to address it. 
                                                 
18 See Meltzer (forthcoming).   24
The first such threat was the fallout from the sterling crisis in the autumn of 1967.  
In addition to raising the discount rate by 50 basis points on November 20
th, 1967, the day 
after sterling was devalued, the FOMC voted to raise rates further in the next meeting on 
November 27
th, 1967 and also at the December 12
th meeting. Not just this timing but also 
the minutes confirm that concerns for the stability of the dollar were heavily responsible for 
these decisions.  According to Mr. Treiber, not tightening would lead to “[i]nflation [that] 
would weaken the position of the dollar internationally at the very time our worldwide 
efforts require that confidence be sustained and strengthened” (p.40).  Irons emphasized 
that “the deterioration in the balance of payments situation was a significant factor…[he 
therefore] proposed  some reduction in the prevailing degree of ease” (p.48).  According to 
Charles Coombs, Special Manager of the System Open Market Account, “In the event of 
[sterling’s] devaluation, he would favor having the System devote all of its attention to 
protecting the dollar” (p.39).  Andrew Brimmer of the  Board of Governors “urged the need 
for contingency planning against a possible devaluation not only to the international finance 
area but also in connection with the use of domestic policy instruments” (p.39).  Sherman 
Maisel of the Board of Governors concluded “that an increase in the Federal Reserve 
discount rate should be considered in connection with contingency planning against the 
probability of devaluation of sterling” (p.49).   
At the meeting on November 27
th, 1967, Maisel again voiced concern that “the U.S. 
might find itself in the same position as the British had recently” (p.43).  A variety of 
expedients to defend the dollar while avoiding the need to tighten monetary policy were 
considered.  Mr. McLaury of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recommended that    25
the Fed use forward operations as a means of reducing the inflow of dollars into foreign 
central banks… he [viewed] the proposed provision of forward cover [as] an alternative to a 
tighter domestic monetary policy as a means of limiting dollar accrual by foreign central 
banks “ (pp.43-45).  Ellis recommended augmenting the swap line.  Still, he acknowledged 
that “[o]ne important ingredient of a program to defend the dollar in the short-run might 
very well be convincing evidence that the Committee intended to contribute to that defense 
in the long-run through its domestic monetary policy…the Committee should make it clear 
that it intended to validate the discount rate action through open market operations” (p.72). 
 There was then little discussion of the balance of payments in the minutes until the 
Gold Pool collapsed in March 1968, rekindling fears for the stability of the dollar.  The 
FOMC voted to increase restraint at each of four consecutive meetings.  In two of them, on 
March 14 and April 19, the decision was primarily for international reasons.  The Fed 
raised the discount rate on March 22
nd, April 19
th and December 12
th.  While the last 
increase, by 25 basis points, was motivated by the desire to counter inflation, a larger 
increase of 50 basis points was rejected on this occasion because of fears of how the dollar 
would be affected were the British in the face of a large capital outflow to the U.S. to 
abandon their peg and float. 
The minutes make clear what was motivating the FOMC.  On March 5
th Mr. Brill of 
the Board of Governors staff observed that “[o]n balance, the package of a half-point 
increase in the discount rate and a quarter point increase in Reg Q ceilings [offers] the best 
hope for achieving fairly prompt financial restraint on expenditures and attracting favorable 
attention from foreign investors, without engendering a panic reaction among financial   26
institutions and financial markets” (p.61).  Hayes warned that “A moderate tightening effort 
should be favorably received abroad as a means of defending the dollar… Thus the present 
is an appropriate time for a policy move” (p.69).   Mr.Coldwell, an alternate member of the 
FOMC, “thought [that] the country was moving toward a serious and perhaps critical 
juncture of destabilizing forces… wage price pressures were increasing…the balance of 
payments deficit showed no improvement and runs on the gold market were occurring with 
increasing frequency.  The overall situation demanded restraint in monetary policy” (p.79). 
At the FOMC meeting on March 14
th, when the decision to suspend the operation of 
the London Gold Pool was announced to the committee, Mr. Coombs warned that “the 
international financial system was moving towards a crisis more dangerous than any since 
1931…[it was] important to protect the exchange parity network…based on the official 
price of $35.00 per ounce for gold…or by making sure that the System swap lines were 
fully adequate to absorb the massive flows of hot money across the exchanges…” (p.4).   
The directive that day included the following: “In light of recent international financial 
developments, the System open market operations… should be conducted with a view to 
maintain firm but orderly conditions in the money market, taking into account the effects of 
the Federal Reserve discount rate” (p.5). The discount rate was then raised on March 22. 
At the meeting on April 2
nd, 1968 Coombs warned that “the breakdown of the gold 
pool was… a major defeat for the central banks and governments involved… the system 
was now considerably more vulnerable than before…”  According to Robert Solomon 
(associate economist at the Board of Governors), “[t]he gold pool supplied gold to private 
speculators in order to forestall a run on the dollar by official holders… But the gold pool   27
policy …designed to maintain credibility in the official price of gold…itself lost 
credibility…”[a] much less happy scenario assumes that inflation continues in the US and 
[the trade balance worsens]…In this unhappy scenario, the world begins to believe that the 
U.S. balance of payments deficit cannot be reduced without drastic measures involving 
…[a] change in the relationship between the dollar and gold… To prevent monetary chaos 
and to assure [a] more favorable evolution, the U.S. must improve its trade balance… both 
domestic and international considerations call for restrictive monetary policy” (p.15-16). 
Brill voiced similar fears: “Our international payments position is more precarious, 
and inaction is proceeding more rapidly than we had estimated even just a month ago…It 
seems to me…that we would be warranted in changing our sights on what is required of 
monetary policy….there seems to be a sufficiently strong argument for turning the 
monetary screws a bit more this time” (p.42).  Hayes predictably agreed: “Although we 
have lived through a major financial crisis since our last regular meeting…the basic facts 
that should determine monetary policy have changed relatively little in that period. The 
crisis did…point up in a most dramatic fashion the perilous position of the dollar reflecting 
the current problems of inflation, lack of fiscal responsibility, and payment imbalances… 
my preference with respect to open market policy would be to move very gradually toward 
even further restraint… The proposed policy will lead to a modest firming of the market 
interest rate and to expectations of another discount rate rise… we should be contemplating 
the possibility of another one half point increase in the discount rate sometime before the 
end of April, when even keel restraint will commence so as to make crystal clear the 
System’s determination to do what it reasonably can to uphold the dollar’s international   28
standing” (p.47-49). According to Mr. Bopp, an alternate member of the FOMC, “further 
tightening would confirm that the committee meant business, and that was necessary for 
both international and domestic reasons” (p.57).  Mr. Daane agreed that “greater monetary 
restraint in the U.S. was necessary to support the decision at the recent meetings in 
Washington [where the two tier gold policy was agreed] and Stockholm  [where provisional 
agreement was reached to issue Special Drawing Rights]…he would be quite amenable to 
another increase in the discount rate…” (p.69-70).  The discount rate was raised by 50 basis 
points on April 19th. 
But this was not enough to dispatch the problem.  At the meeting on May 28
th, 1968, 
Brill stated that “[t]he most urgent need would be associated with our international 
financial problem…the main hope for keeping…in place…existing international financial 
arrangements lies in the promise that measures of restraint here will convince other 
countries that we are serious about our intention to curb inflation…” (p.48). At the meeting 
on December 17
th, 1968 Mr. Hersey, an associate economist at the Board of Governors, 
urged the Committee “to give full consideration to the long-run problem of checking 
inflation and halting the deterioration of the international trading position… The principal 
contribution that monetary policy can make to the defense of  our external financial 
position is through stability of the price level … monetary policy aimed at slowing inflation 
will bring higher interest rates… it is the slowing of inflation that is most needed for 
dealing with the balance of payments problem, not higher interest rates per se” (p.43).  The 
discount rate was raised on December 18
th, 1968, preventing any further deterioration in the 
external situation through the end of 1968.   29
The Nixon Administration, taking office in January 1969, inherited inflation from 
the previous administration but, rather than urging a tightening monetary policy, attempted 
to deal with the problem with wage price guidelines and later wage-price controls.  There 
also was widespread discussion of the possibility of floating the dollar in response to the 
chronic balance of payments deficit and loss of gold reserves.  Arthur Burns, who became 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve in February 1970, viewed such international 
considerations as primarily Treasury’s problem. 
A long period followed when there was limited discussion of balance of payments 
problems. In 1971, the problem then resurfaced a final time. In the April 6
th, 1971 FOMC 
meeting, the vote was for tightening.  A minority led by Hayes wanted more tightening than 
the Committee was willing to vote for to defend the dollar – Hayes emphasized that “the 
international financial situation should be given a high priority in the FOMC’s policy 
deliberations” (p.35) – but the majority was preoccupied by the precarious state of the 
economy.  Chairman Burns saw grounds for optimism on the external front, though he 
remained cautious.  “In the international area, he found it most encouraging that short-term 
interest rates in the U.S. and abroad were finally beginning to converge… He observed that 
the dollar had come under speculative pressure that had begun to reach dangerous 
proportions last week…the recovery was quite fragile, and economic conditions in general 
were at a delicate stage. He had a vivid recollection of 1931, when the Federal Reserve had 
raised its discount rate and acted to stiffen short- term rates because of a balance of 
payments problem, and an incipient recovery had been cut off…He concurred in the 
suggestion that short-term rates should  now be permitted to move up a little further..”   30
(p.56).  Hayes, predictably, was more alarmist, warning that “…on the international side we 
seem to be moving into the kind of major crisis that has long loomed as a probability in the 
light of our huge payments deficit, especially on the official settlements basis; and the sharp 
contrast between interest rates here and abroad. Under these circumstances I think we 
should promote a firming of short-term interest rates to the extent this can be accepted 
without causing major repercussions in the bond market” (p.57).  Hayes concluded that he 
found it “necessary to dissent from the proposed directive, which he thought gave 
inadequate recognition to the need for moving toward somewhat higher short-term interest 
rates in light of the international financial situation” (p.83). 
At the May 11
th meeting, the FOMC voted for increased restraint because of 
concern over the international situation, although it rejected the 50 basis point rise in the 
discount rate requested by the New York Fed, citing concerns over the weakness of growth.  
The Chairman summarized the situation.  “Toward the end of last month one Reserve Bank 
[New York] had proposed a discount rate increase of one-half point. The Board had voted 
to disapprove the increase for the following reasons. 1. …it was concerned about the effects 
on debt markets, which were in a highly sensitive condition. 2….with the economic 
recovery still fragile, a discount rate increase could damage confidence. 3. The Board 
feared a rise in the discount rate might have a significant impact on long-term interest 
rates” (p.52).   
Hayes, predictably, disagreed.  “Last Thursday our directors voted unanimously to 
raise the discount rate by one half per cent to 5 ¼%.  They recognized that under ordinary 
circumstances such a move would not be desirable, coming just after a Treasury refunding   31
operation.  They also recognized that the usual sequence in working toward a firmer 
monetary policy would be to start with open market operations and to use the discount rate 
as a confirming action.  Finally they were aware that a ½% discount rate increase could 
have substantial unsettling effects on the delicately poised bond market. Nevertheless, the 
directors felt that in this major international crisis there was nothing  the System could do 
that could be more useful and more timely than to give an overt signal of our concern and 
our willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the interest rate spread which was a 
major cause of the difficulty…. They felt that prompt action on the discount rate serves as 
an important signal both to authorities in Germany and other countries that were in the 
process of making crucial decisions, and to the unsettled foreign exchange market that the 
U.S. intended to defend the value of the dollar while recognizing the risks involved in a 
general increase in domestic interest rates, they felt that these risks were outweighed by 
international considerations, more particularly against the background of rapid growth in 
money and credit aggregates… I regret that the Board was not willing to approve the 
increase last week. But it is still not too late to move, and a discount rate increase might 
well play an important role in the eventual resolution of the exchange market problem” 
(p.56).  His arguments registered.  In June, to defend the dollar the System raised the 
discount rate by 25 basis points. This was followed by a 50 basis point rise in the Federal 
funds rate in July. 
In the last meeting before the end of the dollar peg on July 27
th, 1971, Hayes and the 
other members, while voting for increased restraint and acknowledging the seriousness of 
the situation, were reluctant to apply additional monetary restraint owing to concern for the   32
domestic economy.  Instead they pinned their hopes on incomes policy and other measures 
including the tariff surcharge to strengthen the balance of payments.  To Hayes it seemed 
clear that “the U.S. balance of trade and the overall balance of payments were in an 
especially critical state…” (p.32).  “The firming of short-term interest rates that has already 
occurred has…helped in a major way, along with some interest declines abroad, in 
checking the interest induced short-run capital flow that paved the way for the May 
currency crisis. While further firming of the money market might bring some additional 
benefit in this area, I think that for domestic reasons we have done about all we can afford 
to do at the moment in the monetary field for the balance of payments and by way of a 
control to combating inflation psychology. We cannot overlook the fact that the economic 
recovery is still rather fragile and that unemployment seems likely to drop only slowly over 
the coming year … my willingness to hold still on monetary policy in no sense implies the 
absence of great concern over the prospects for containing inflation and a drastically 
unsatisfactory balance of payments position. These conditions underlie the urgent need for 
an effective incomes policy. I also believe the time is ripe for a hard look at a new 
“package” approach to ways of reducing our international payments deficit” (p.55-56).  
With monetary policy sidelined, the pressure on the dollar could not be contained.  On 
August 15th, facing the prospect of massive Western European conversion of outstanding 
dollar balances into gold, President Nixon closed the gold window, effectively ending the 
Bretton Woods System. 
Thus, we also see in this second period sporadic mention in the minutes of the 
stability of the dollar and balance of payments concerns.  However, these issues arose at   33
longer intervals.  Not only were they more widely separated in time, but one can see an 
even more explicit balancing in the statements of FOMC members of the need to defend the 
dollar against the need to support economic activity.  This reflected the growing importance 
attached to stimulating output and employment not just within the Fed but in the Treasury 
and the Administrative Branch more generally.  But it also reflected the perception that 
primary responsibility for dealing with the dollar crisis had been assumed by the Treasury, 
which would deploy an ever widening array of non-monetary instruments in the effort to 
resolve it.   
   
5.  Quantitative Evidence 
  Quantitative evidence can lend support to our view by showing that the Fed’s 
commitment to defense of the dollar helped to anchor inflation through 1965.  We show 
that monetary policy was even tighter in this period than concern with inflation and the 
domestic economy alone would predict, suggesting a role for factors like the weakness of 
the balance of payments.  We show that inflation was less persistent and that expectations 
were better anchored than subsequently.  The evidence points to a break in 1965 at the time 
when balance-of-payments considerations stopped figuring as prominently in the calculus 
of the FOMC. 
In Figure 2 we show the Fed’s monetary policy rule as calibrated by Taylor 
(1999).
19  We combined his parameters with data on inflation and on the output gap 
                                                 
19 We also estimated our own version of the Taylor rule using the forward looking approach of Romer and 
Romer (2002), focusing on the period 1959-Q1 – 1971-Q3.   Romer and Romer evaluated Federal Reserve 
policy in the 1950s.  They estimated the forward looking Taylor Rule in the manner of Clarida, Gali and   34
measured using measured real GDP less the most recent Bureau of Economic Analysis 
estimates of potential real GDP.   In addition we calculate a Taylor Rule using Orphanides’ 
(2003) real time data on the output gap (using data from the original Bureau of Economic 
Analysis sources, not data as subsequently revised, which is arguably appropriate as 
indicating what policy makers focused on at the time).   
As can be seen, before 1965 policy was even tighter than would be expected on the 
basis of inflation and the output gap alone.  The difference is minor when we calculate the 
output gap mechanically but quite dramatic when using Orphanides’ method.  Thereafter, 
policy is generally looser than expected, dramatically so when we use a simple measure of 
the output gap but more modestly when using Orphanides’ approach. 
    Figure 3 shows three measures of inflation and inflation persistence: the percentage 
change in the CPI, in the GDP deflator, and in money wages.  We plot the raw data in panel 
a and the serial correlation of inflation based on an AR (1) regression using a ten year 
rolling window in panel b.  To correct for the bias that arises when persistence is estimated 
using OLS (Andrews 1993), we show the median unbiased estimator for each series in 
panel c.  As can be seen from the rolling regression and median unbiased estimates, 
inflation persistence increased dramatically after 1965.   
We also use statistical methods to estimate underlying inflation persistence and ask 
whether there is evidence of a shift around 1965.  Like Cecchetti, Hooper, Kasman, 
                                                                                                                                                     
Gertler (2000), according to which the Federal Reserve chooses the federal funds rate in response to inflation 
and the deviation of output from trend.   This method is forward looking in that the Federal Reserve is 
assumed to respond to expectations of the variables. The equation is estimated using instrumental variables, 
where the instruments are contemporaneous and two lags of inflation, and output deviations. We used two 
measures of the output gap; one based on BEA potential output; the other based on a Hodrick-Prescott trend 
of real GDP.  The coefficient on inflation was statistically significant and close to one and satisfies the Taylor 
principle, while the coefficient on the output gap is quite small.   35
Schoenholtz and Watson (2007), we use Stock and Watson’s (2002, 2006) smoothed 
estimator to construct estimates of the trend (permanent) and transitory components of 
inflation using nonlinear methods analogous to the Kalman filter.  In the top panel of 
Figure 4 we separate inflation into a permanent or trend component and a transitory 
component.  In the middle panel we show the first order autocorrelation of the change in 
U.S. inflation.  This statistic summarizes the relative importance in the inflation process of 
the variances of the permanent and transitory components.  The dotted line shows the break 
point at which the inflation process becomes persistent.  Finally the bottom panel, for 
comparison shows two measures of external balance: the official settlements balance of 
payments deficit (surplus) and the current account deficit (surplus). 
As can be seen from the upper panel of Figures 4.1 and 4.2, trend inflation follows 
actual inflation with a lag. Actual and trend inflation both rise in the mid-1960s, around the 
time of the shift in the locus of primary responsibility for managing the balance of 
payments. The calculated break in the inflation persistence process, in contrast, occurs in 
1968, while the middle panel shows a steady pickup in the importance of the permanent 
component of inflation through the 1960s.  The results for wages in Figure 4.3 are different 
from those on inflation. They show a much slower build up of inflationary momentum with 
the break in trend only coming in 1973. 
Finally, there is evidence that these changes did not escape the attention of investors.  
In Figure 5 we show the Livingston survey of inflation expectations.
20  While the series is 
volatile, there is a clear break in 1965, as one would expect on the basis of our analysis.
21 
                                                 
20 Data are from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.   36
Even this limited empirical analysis confirms the complexity of the inflation process 
in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Over time inflation accelerated, became more persistent, and 
exhibited greater volatility.  There appear to have been a number of different break points 
depending on the aspect of the process under consideration: at or around 1965, at the end of 
the 1960s, and in the early 1970s.  The break around 1965 is plausibly associated at least in 
part with the declining weight placed by the Fed in its policy decisions on the weakness of 
the balance of payments and the fragility of the dollar.  The fact that monetary policy was 
even tighter in preceding years than one would expect on the basis of inflation and the 
output gap alone confirms that the Fed had been factoring in other considerations to its 
policy decisions, plausibly the balance-of-payments considerations described above. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
  Explanations for the acceleration of inflation in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
emphasize a growing tendency to characterize the inflation problem as unrelated to Federal 
Reserve policy (Romer and Romer 2002a, Nelson 2005), as resulting from an excessively 
stimulative or overly accommodating monetary policy that failed to take inflation control as 
its central focus (DeLong 1997, Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2000), and as reflecting a 
mistaken belief in an exploitable Phillips Curve tradeoff (Taylor 1992, Sargent 1999).  
                                                                                                                                                     
21  In addition, there is the evidence of Chen and Giovannini (1992), who used a target zone framework to 
estimate the probability, implicit in forward exchange rates and interest differentials, that the dollar would be 
devalued against the deutschmark during the Bretton Woods period.  They find essentially no perceived 
probability of dollar devaluation before 1965 but a growing probability in the second half of the Bretton 
Woods period.  The problem with this test is that the deutschmark price of gold could also change if the 
German currency was revalued against the dollar, as it in fact was on a couple of occasions under Bretton 
Woods.   37
There is insight in all of these interpretations.  No account of the Great Inflation would be 
complete without them.   
But neither would it be complete without recognition of the changing role of the 
external constraint in FOMC members’ calculations.  It is not as if it took until the end of 
the 1960s for the idea of an exploitable Phillips Curve tradeoff to come to Washington.   
Romer and Romer (2002) show that this idea was already being advanced by the Council of 
Economic Advisors in the early 1960s.  It can be argued that much of the decade had to 
pass before the ideas pushed by the Council were internalized by the Fed.  Or perhaps not 
until President Johnson gave William McChesney Martin his famous verbal lashing and 
bounced him around the LBJ ranch in a jeep did the Chairman disregard inflation as 
monetary policy’s central focus and accept an unrealistically low estimate of the natural 
rate.  To repeat, we agree that there is something to these points.   
But in addition the record suggests that adoption of these ideas was delayed and 
willingness to act on them was constrained by the responsibility that FOMC members felt 
for defending the dollar and strengthening the balance of payments.  This was a shared 
responsibility of Treasury and the Fed, but one that the Fed took seriously in the first half 
of the 1960s.  And so long as it did so, the temptation to inflate was restrained.   
What changed in the course of the first half of the decade was application by 
Treasury, with the consent of Congress, of a series of fiscal measures like the Interest 
Equalization Tax intended to strengthen the balance of payments.  This affected the Fed’s 
thinking through two channels.  First, Treasury’s activism encouraged the belief that 
another agency had assumed primary responsibility for managing the balance-of-payments   38
problem – that the Fed was now entitled to delegate the task.  Second, measures like the 
Interest Equalization Tax that placed sand in the wheels of international financial markets 
encouraged the Fed to believe that it could loosen monetary policy and allow inflation to 
rise without posing as immediate a threat to the dollar as before. 
This is not the only set of considerations that distinguished monetary policy in the 
first and second half of the 1960s.  But it is an important part of the story.  The even more 
dramatic acceleration of inflation in the 1970s when the exchange rate constraint was 
removed entirely only reinforces the point. 
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Figure 1. FOMC Policy Actions and Dissents from FOMC Policy Actions. 
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Figure 2. The Classic Taylor Rule 
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Figure 3. CPI Inflation and Inflation Persistence : G10, Quarterly data 1959 I to 1979 
III 
 

















Data sources:  
GDP deflator : Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce 
CPI : Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor 
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3.2 US Serial Correlation of Inflation: 1959 I to 1979 III 
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3.3.2 CPI 
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Figure 4.1  CPI Inflation, Inflation Persistence and the Balance of Payments 1959 I to 1979 III 
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Figure 4.2 GDP Inflation, Inflation Persistence and the Balance of Payments 1959 I to 1979 III 
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Figure 4.3 Wage Inflation, Inflation Persistence and the Balance of Payments 1959I to 1979III 
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Appendix 1.  Nonmonetary Measures to Strengthen the Balance of Payments 
  This appendix describes some of the nonmonetary measures pursued by the 
Treasury and the Administrative Branch in the 1960s with the goal of managing the balance 
of payments and strengthening the dollar.
22 
A first significant initiative was the Gold Pool, initially proposed by Treasury to 
foreign governments and accepted by the latter in October 1961.  Central banks managed 
the pool on a day-to-day basis, operating as a gold sales consortium in the effort to stabilize 
the dollar price of gold and limit U.S. gold losses.  The United States contributed 50 per 
cent of the resources of the pool, while four large European countries – the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy – contributed about ten per cent each and three 
smaller Europeans – Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland – kicked in about three per 
cent each.  The idea was that when there was demand on the London gold market for gold 
at more than $35 an ounce, creating an incentive for foreign official purchasers to convert 
their dollars into gold in the United States, the price would be pushed back down by the 
consortium of central banks, sharing the burden in this fashion, and not simply by the 
Federal Reserve acting as agent of the Treasury.   
The Gold Pool never worked perfectly.  There was a tendency for foreign central 
banks to replenish their gold reserves by converting dollars into gold after selling gold into 
the market.  The arrangement broke down entirely after 1968.  But so long as it operated, it 
encouraged the belief that U.S. gold losses would be limited. 
                                                 
22 The account here draws on Meltzer (1991) and Eichengreen (2000).   50
A second notable initiative was the Interest Equalization Tax (IET) of 1963.  The 
IET was designed to strengthen the dollar and balance of payments by discouraging long-
term lending to foreign countries.  A tax equal to a one per cent rate of interest was 
imposed in 1963 on foreign bonds sold in the United States.  To the extent that it was 
effective, this loosened the link between domestic and foreign interest rates and therefore 
the impact on the balance of payments of expansionary monetary policy.  However, bank 
loans could be substituted for bonds – in response to which the tax was extended in 1965 to 
bank loans to foreigners with a maturity of more than one year.  Short-term credits could be 
extended and rolled over as a substitute for long-term commitments.  Some authors (e.g. 
Meltzer 1991) conclude that the IET, even as augmented, had relatively little effect, 
although others (e.g. Obstfeld 1993) point to them as explaining the magnitude of U.S.-
foreign interest differentials.  But what matters from the present point of view is what 
policy makers likely believed regarding its effectiveness, and presumably such measures 
would have not been imposed had there been no confidence in their effectiveness. 
A third initiative was to tie U.S. foreign aid.  New aid commitments in the early 
1960s were limited to countries that agreed to spend the dollars they thereby received in the 
United States.  U.S. commitments to the Inter-American Development Bank’s Fund for 
Special Operations were similarly made subject to restrictions that made it difficult to use 
them except for purchasing U.S. merchandise.  Measures such as these are estimated to 
have doubled the share of U.S. aid spent on American goods over the first half of the 1960s. 
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations adopted a series of initiatives designed 
to limit U.S. defense spending abroad.  In 1962 the Defense Department instituted a Buy   51
American program in which preference was given to American suppliers even when their 
goods were as much as 50 per cent more expensive than substitutes that might be procured 
abroad.  Simultaneously with the announcement of the Interest Equalization Tax, it was 
announced that defense spending abroad would be reduced by $1 billion.  Foreign 
governments were pressured to buy U.S. military hardware as their quid pro quo for the 
stationing of American troops abroad.    
Then there were various and sundry export-promotion initiatives.  In 1963, for 
example, the White House held a conference on export expansion, at which the President 
and cabinet officials spent more than three hours exhorting business to sell more products 
abroad.  Instances of such exhortation became commonplace in subsequent years. 
Finally, in 1965 the Johnson Administration negotiated a series of voluntary 
agreements with U.S. corporations designed to limit their foreign purchases and investment 
commitments.  Each company was asked to submit a corporate balance of payments 
account and to indicate what steps it was taking to improve its balance by 15 to 20 per cent.  
Companies were then asked to commit to further improving in their corporate balances of 
payments in 1966.  From 1968 the program was made mandatory and administered by the 
Office of Foreign Direct Investment.  This initiative was also applied to U.S. banks.  
Individual banks were asked to ensure that their foreign lending as of end-1965 did not 
exceed end-1964 levels by more than 5 per cent.  A similar ceiling was set for end-1966 
lending, this time at 109 per cent of end-1964 levels.  From 1966, nonbank financial 
institutions were also requested to limit the rate of growth of their foreign investments. 
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Appendix 2.  FOMC Policy Actions 
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